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Desc: | This course will examine a set of foundational issues relevant to ethics but also to other parts of philosophy that concern "normative" matters. What is to have a reason to do, believe, or desire something? How does having reasons bear on what you ought to do, believe, desire? How does having reasons bear on what it is rational for a person to do, etc.? Is rationality merely a matter of being "consistent" - or does it require conforming your actions, beliefs, etc. to good reasons? (Relatedly: can a conspiracy theorist "with an answer for everything" be rational? do they have good reasons?) How should we think of the relation between reasons and what's valuable? On one view, what's valuable determines reasons: we have reasons to do, believe, desire something only insofar as by doing so we promote or respect something valuable. Value comes first, and reasons exist only insofar as they are related appropriate to value. On another view, this relationship is reversed: the existence of the reasons explains why something is valuable.
In general, in the course we will discuss reasons and their relations to oughts, rationality and value, and the broader significance of this for philosophy. Readings will come from major books and articles, mainly from the 20th and 21st century, by authors including Pamela Hieronymi, Christine Korsgaard, Derek Parfit, Thomas Scanlon, and Bernard Williams.
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| Actions: | | Books | | Syllabus | | Syllabi are provided to students to support their course planning; refer to the syllabus for constraints on use. |
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