| 01 | --W---- | 4:00P-6:50P | Wilson / 104 | McGrath | See Instructor | 19 | 9 | 0 |
Desc: | In this seminar, we will examine several ways the epistemic might relate to the practical. One is for some of the traditional objects of epistemic evaluation to be practical in nature. For instance, there is a long tradition of understanding judgment and the suspension of judgment as agential, as something that we do in an aim and perhaps even something that falls within the domain of the will. Other phenomena of traditional interest to epistemologists arguably have agential elements, including taking things for granted, inferring, reasoning, treating something as an open possibility, etc. A second way the epistemic might relate to the practical is for epistemic evaluation to be a species of practical evaluation, or at least continuous with it. For instance, some philosophers claim that epistemic rationality is a species of instrumental (means-end) rationality, a prime form of practical rationality. Others claim that epistemic justification is teleological in nature, a kind of justification of the same type that actions can have, one concerned with what promotes a certain sort of good. A third way is for certain epistemic phenomena, even if not practical themselves, to bear important relationships to practical phenomena. For instance, some philosophers argue that knowledge is the norm of certain activities, e.g., assertion and practical reasoning, and that ignorance is the norm of others, e.g., inquiry. |
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| Actions: | | Books | | Syllabus | | Syllabi are provided to students to support their course planning; refer to the syllabus for constraints on use. |
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